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UNCONSCIONABILITY-THE CODE, THE COURT
AND THE CONSUMER
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of unconscionability has long been applied by equity courts
to deny specific enforcement of contracts whose provisions are unreasonably
harsh and burdensome to one of the parties.' This equitable doctrine was
adopted in statutory form by Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
Code to allow.
 courts to "police explicitly" against unconscionable contracts, 2
yet nowhere in the Code is the term "unconscionable" defined. 3
 This fact has
led several commentators to question the meaning and usefulness of section
2-302.4
 Unfortunately, these discussions have largely_ been speculative, for
although Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt the Uniform Commer-
cial Code in 1954, it was not until 1964 that section 2-302 was even cited as
an alternative holding in the case of American Home Improvement Co. v.
Maclver.5
Within the past year, however, a number of decisions have been handed
down citing section 2-302 either directly or as an alternative basis for the
court's holding. Even though these decisions mark only the beginning of the
development of section 2-302, they do provide a basis to evaluate the early
criticism of section 2-302 and some indication as to the direction application
of this section will take. It is the purpose of this comment to examine these
cases in light of the prior criticism of section 2-302 in order to determine
whether any pattern emerges to provide guidance for the future use of the
section.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
In its entirety section 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law, finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
1 E.g.,Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 (1908) ; Kleinberg v. Ratett,
252 N.Y. 236, 169 N.E. 289 (1929). See J. Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts
§ 40 (3d ed. 1926).
2 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1. That many of the states who adopted § 2-302 felt
that they were incorporating equity principles into sales law is evident from the official
comments to the various state statutes. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 5A, § 2-302 (1967) ;
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 672.2-302 (1966) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 26, § 2-302 (Smith-Hurd 1963) ;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 336.2-302 (1966); N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A:2-302 (1962) ; Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 62A.2-302 (1966). In all, 49 states have adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code. Of these, California and North Carolina have omitted § 2-302. All Uniform Com-
mercial Code citations are to the 1962 Official Text.
a The few definitions that do exist at common law, being phrased in terms of an
emotional response to a given factual situation, provide little help in understanding its
meaning. For example, an unconscionable contract has been defined as one in which "no
sensible man not under delusion, duress, or in distress would make, and such as no
honest and fair man would accept." Stiefler v. McCullough, 174 N.E. 823, 826 (Ind.
1931).
4 See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 485 (1967); 1 W. Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial
Code, § 1.1601, at 44-45 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Hawkland).
5 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
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was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its com-
mercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
As has previously been noted the statute does not attempt to define "uncon-
scionable." However, to aid courts in applying this statute, the official com-
ments to the section set out a basic test: " [W1 hether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular
trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract." 8
In explanation of this test of "one-sidedness" the comments advance two
principles. These principles are (1) the prevention of oppression and (2) the
prevention of unfair surprise.'
Unfair surprise occurs as a result of the nondrafting party having been
unaware at the time the contract was entered into that certain harsh and
burdensome conditions exist in the contract. Such unfair surprise may be
created in two ways. First, the terms of the contract are drafted in language
so complex that it is unreasonable to expect the nondrafting party to under-
stand their rneaning.8 Second, a clause of the contract is so inconspicuous
that it is unreasonable to expect that the nondrafting party will read or
comprehend it.°
The principle of oppression involves two considerations: (1) the circum-
stances under which the contract was made, and (2) the resulting contractual
impositions. In the first instance, "oppression" refers to a situation whereby
one party because of a lack of any real bargaining power 1° is unable to alter
the terms of the contract. This can result from two economic situations.
First, the supply of goods may be so limited that the seller has virtually a
monopolistic control over their distribution. Second, although there is a large
supply of goods available, an entire industry may regulate their sale in such
a way as to prevent the consumer from having any meaningful choice as to the
terms of the bargain." In both economic situations, the consumer must take
6	§ 2-302, Comment 1.
Id.
8 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
See, e.g., New Prague Flouring Mill Co: v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815
(1922), where the court refused to enforce a contract whose provisions were embodied
in fine print and the defendant, due to poor eyesight, was unable to read them. This
case is noted in U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment I, as an example of an appropriate case for the
application of § 2-302.
10 Sec Comment, Unconscionable Sales Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code,
Section 2-302, 45 Va. L. Rev. 583, 586 (1959).
11 An example of this situation is the employment in all the contracts of a particular
industry of a standard clause limiting the rights of redress of the consumer. See, e.g.,
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the terms as dictated or not at all. The resulting contractual impositions
must be, by definition, unreasonably burdensome to be "oppressive!'" If the
terms of the contract are not unreasonably harsh to one of the parties, lack
of bargaining power or surprise should not be sufficient to render the contract
unconscionable.
The critics of section 2-302 feel that the tests set out in the comments
provide little guidance for the application of the statute. This has led to
three general criticisms: (1) that section 2-302 leaves the applicability of the
section solely to the discretion of the individual court, a factor, it is feared,
which will lead to abuse, inconsistency and carelessness in decision making;"
(2) that businessmen will have great difficulty in determining proper business
conduct" and draftsmen will have no guidelines to assist them in making
contracts; 15 and (3) that the remedies by which the courts may enforce the
remainder of a contract without the unconscionable clauses or "may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result" allows the courts to make contracts to which neither of the parties
has agreed." Whether or not these criticisms of section 2-302 have proven
valid can best be determined by analyzing the cases decided under section
2-302.
III. THE CASES DECIDED UNDER SECTION 2-302
The first case to cite section 2-302 was American Home Improvement Co.
v. MacIver,17 in which the plaintiff company agreed to install windows and a
door and to flintcoat the sidewalls of the defendant's house for $1,759.00. In
consideration, MacIver signed a financing agreement providing a rate of pay-
ment of $42.81 per month for sixty months—a total cost to the defendant of
$2,568.60—but the agreement did not state the rate of interest the home-
owner would have to pay. After the plaintiff had completed only a negligible
amount of work, Maclver ordered the work stopped, and the company sued
for damages.
On the basis of the New Hampshire "truth-in-lending" statute," Mac-
Iver's contention that the contract was void for failing to disclose the interest
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), where the court
refused to uphold the disclaimer of warranty used by all major automobile manufacturers
which limited consumers' remedies to replacement of defective parts.
12 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1584 (1963).
13 See Ireton, The Commercial Code, 22 Miss. L.J. 273, 280 (1951) ; Comment,
Policing Contracts Under the Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 146, 152
(1950).
14 See Hawkland at 45; Note, Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code; The
Consequences of Unconscionability in Sales Contracts, 63 Yale L.J. 560, 56S (1954).
15 But see 1 New York Law Revision Commission Report, Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code 177-78 (1954) (hereinafter cited as NYLRCR).
13 1 NYLRCR at 98; King, Suggested Changes in the Uniform Commercial Code—
Sales, 33 Ore. L. Rev. 113, 115 (1954).
17 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
18 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 399-B:2 (Supp. 1967) provides that at the time credit
is extended the borrower must be furnished with "a clear statement in writing setting
forth the finance charges, expressed in dollars, rate of interest, or monthly rate of
charge, or a combination thereof, to be borne by such person in connection with such
extension of credit as originally scheduled."
369
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
rates was upheld by the court. In discussing the disclosure issue the court
examined the price of $2,568.60 that Maclver had to pay, breaking it down
into three items: (1) a sales commission of $800.00; (2) interest and carry-
ing charges of $809.60; and (3) goods and services valued at $959.00. Thus,
concluded the court, the defendant was paying an additional $1,609.60 for
goods and services valued at $959.00. Under these circumstances, the court
declared that for the purpose of implementing the disclosure statute the
company could not recover under the contract."
The court then went on to state that for "another and independent rea-
son" recovery should be denied the company because the transaction was un-
conscionable under Section 2-302 of the U.C.C. 2° Unfortunately the court did
not pursue in depth its reasoning behind the applicability of this section.
The only statement that vaguely suggests the court's reasoning declares that
"In as much as the defendants have received little or nothing of value and
under the transaction they entered into they were paying $1,609.00 for goods
and services valued at far less, the contract should not be enforced because of
its unconscionable features."2 ' Yet this has led several commentators to view
the court's decision as equating unconscionability with "too expensive." 22
Inequality of value and price is one indication that unconscionable provisions
may exist but it is hardly justifiable to conclude from the court's discussion of
unconscionability that this was the sole basis for the court's decision. The
more reasonable interpretation would seem to be that various facts in the case
contributed to the court's determination. All the facts involved in this case,
including that of price, were discussed in conjunction with the disclosure issue.
The court in declaring that for "another and independent reason" recovery
could not be granted because the transaction was unconscionable, isolates this
declaration from all factual discussion. This would more logically suggest that
the court considered all the elements of the case in deciding that the contract
was unconscionable, not just the price issue.
This conclusion is borne out by the court's statement that "the contract
should not be enforced because of its unconscionable features." "Features"
reinforces the idea that more than one factor led to the court's holding. The
court's discussion of the failure to disclose the interest rate strongly suggests
the presence of unfair surprise. Disclosure statutes, declared the court, are
"designed to inform the uninformed and this includes many average individ-
uals who have neither the capability nor the strength to calculate the cost of
19 The interest rate that Maclver was to pay may be calculated from the formula:
24C
=R
where C equals
payments to be
550 & n.264 for
If one discounts
L(N+ 1)
the cost of the loan; L, the amount of the loan; N the number of
made; and R the annual simple interest rate. See Leff, supra note 4, at
a discussion of this formula. In the Maclver case, the calculation is:
24 x 810
	 = 18.1%
1759 X 61
the salesman's commission, the calculation yields slightly over 33%.
20 105 N.H. at 439, 201 A.2d at 888-89.
21 Id. at 439, 201 A.2d at 889.
22 See Leff, supra note 4, at 548 & n.259.
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the credit that has been extended to them." 23
 Failure to state the rate of
credit therefore can result in unfair surprise to the consumer. Thus it would
appear that several elements in this case led to the court's decision.
Significantly, however, the equating of high price with unconscionability
is the interpretation that later courts have given to Maclver. For this reason,
however unjustified, Maclver may mark the beginning of a possible trend
toward voiding contracts under section 2-302 where a great disparity exists
between price and value.
The next case in the judicial development of section 2-302 is Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.24 The defendant, Mrs. Williams, in order to
purchase various household items from the Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.
during the period 1957-1962, signed a number of form contracts providing
for payments to be made in installments. Under the terms of these contracts,
which were widely used by the company,25 the items were purportedly
leased to her for a stipulated monthly rental. Title to each item remained
with the company until the total of the payments equalled the purchase price
of the item, at which time title was to pass to Mrs. Williams. However the
contracts further contained a clause which provided that,
"the amount of each periodical installment payment to be made by
[purchaser] to the Company under this present lease shall be inclu-
sive of and not in addition to the amount of each installment pay-
ment to be made by [purchaser] under such prior leases, bills or
accounts; and all payments now and hereafter made by [purchaser]
shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and ac-
counts due the Company by [purchaser] at the time each such
payment is made." Emphasis added.) Y 6
The effect of this clause was to keep a balance due on all items purchased.
As a result, a default in payment for any one item allowed the company to
repossess all the items previously purchased. Furthermore, as these contracts
were drafted as lease arrangements, money paid under them would be treated
as rental charges and, hence, nonreturnable.
In Mrs. Williams' situation, she had paid the furniture company
$1,400.00 for merchandise purchased since 1957, and at the time of her
latest purchase—a $514.95 stereo—she only owed $164.00. When Mrs. Wil-
liams failed to meet her payments on the stereo, the company brought suit,
under the terms of the contract, to recover all items purchased since 1957.
At the trial, it was established that at the time Mrs. Williams entered into
the last contract the company knew that she had seven children to support
on her welfare allowance of $218.00 per month from the Government."
Section 2-302 was not in effect in Washington, D.C. at the time the
parties entered into the contract in question, but as this case was one of
first impression, the court used the section as persuasive authority in declaring
23
 105 N.H. at 438, 201 A.2d at 887.
24 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
25 Id, at 447.
26 Id,
27 Id. at 448.
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the contract void. In reaching the result, the court laid down several guide-
lines for determining unconscionability under section 2-302; (1) an absence
of meaningful choice caused by an inequality of bargaining power, (2) terms
unreasonably favorable to one party, and (3) a lack of reasonable opportunity
to understand the contract because the terms were hidden in fine print or
clouded over by deceptive sales practices.23 These tests reflect the principles
of oppression and unfair surprise set out in the official comments to section
2-302.
Several facts in the Walker case point to the existence of oppression
and unfair surprise. The form contract used by the furniture company is
a device which often gives the merchant an advantage of surprise over the
consumer. 29 By placing the complexly worded provision in the body of a
form contract, the company discouraged Mrs. Williams from reading or
understanding it. The resulting harshness of the provision indicates the op-
pressive nature of the transaction. Mrs. Williams by defaulting on payments
for one item in 1962 was to lose through repossession all the items purchased
since 1957.3° This result becomes even more oppressive when viewed with
the already precarious financial condition of Mrs. Williams.
The principles proclaimed in the Walker case were adopted by the next
court to apply section 2-302, in Application of State of New York v. ITM,
Inc.". This action was brought on behalf of the State of New York by the
Attorney General, pursuant to a statute empowering him to bring an action
against any person who fraudulently or illegally conducts a business. 32
ITM was engaged in the business of selling household goods to con-
sumers at their homes under retail installment contracts providing for pay-
ments to be made over an extended period of time. To induce the consumer
to sign this contract, ITM developed what was known as a "referral sales
program." Under this scheme, the consumer was to submit twenty names of
other prospective customers. For each sale made to one of these suggested
customers, the consumer would receive a commission. By this arrangement,
the consumer was assured that his own purchases would ultimately cost him
nothing. Because of this assurance ITM was able to sell to the consumer
broilers which cost the company $80.00 for $658.08, vacuum cleaners which
cost it $140.00 for $920.52, and color television sets which cost ITM $450.00
for $1,292.40. 33 Testimony at the trial demonstrated that if just twelve out
of every twenty names submitted by each consumer were to enroll in this
system, by the seventh stage millions of people would be involved in pur-
chasing these items. If projected further, this number would soon exceed the
world's population. Depending on the size of the sales force, a juncture
28 Id. at 449.
20 It has been stated that § 2-302 is primarily aimed at this type of merchant-
consumer form contract. See Marsh and Warren, Report on Proposed Amendments to the
Uniform Commercial Code, at 2-18 (1961).
30 350 F.2d at 447.
81 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
32 N.Y. Executive Law § 63, subd. 12 (McKinney 1967). The term "fraud" is
defined in this provision to include 'any device, scheme or artifice to defraud and any
deception, or . • . unconscionable contractual provisions."
a3 52 Misc. 2d at 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
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would soon be reached where the plan had to "fail as a matter of economic
feasibility and mathematical certainty." 34
The court voided all the transactions entered into between the company
and its customers on the grounds of fraud." It further found the contracts
to be unconscionable under Section 2-302 of the U.C.C." In this area, the
court's discussion centered largely around the disparity between value and
price found in these installment contracts. The court cited Macher for the
proposition that high price alone is grounds for finding unconscionability. 37
The court, however, was not completely willing to adopt this view. Instead
it held that the high prices, when viewed in conjunction with the deceptive
sales practices employed by the company, were unconscionable. 38
Several facts in the ITM case indicate that the consumers did not have
a reasonable opportunity to understand the contract. The defendant employed
a retail installment contract. This type of contract may disguise discrepan-
cies in price by stressing only the small weekly sum the consumer need pay,
thus clouding over the much higher total cost actually being charged. When
used with the other sales practices involved in these transactions, the dis-
crepancy between the actual value of the goods and its eventual cost to the
consumer becomes even more obscure. By emphasizing the rich rewards from
the commissions, the seller deluded the consumer into thinking that he would
actually profit by this system. The court also found that it was not reason-
able to expect the consumer to see the fallacies in the arrangement. 3° The
consumer's chance to profit by this method largely depended on how far
the "chain" had already progressed because of the diminishing field of
purchasers in a given locale. Without this information, the consumer had
no way of measuring his chance of success.
Up to this time, however, no court had used section 2-302 as the sole
basis for its decision. The first case decided wholly under the section, and
the first to apply the third remedy that section 2-302(2) makes available
to the court, was the case of Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso." The defendants,
husband and wife, were Spanish-speaking people who negotiated orally with
a Spanish-speaking salesman for the purchase of a refrigerator-freezer unit.
During the conversation, the husband told the salesman he would be unem-
ployed in a week and could not afford the unit. The salesman assured them
that, under a referral sales arrangement similar to the one in /Till, the unit
would cost them nothing because of the commissions they would receive on
the sales that would purportedly be made to their friends. The couple was
then given an installment contract to sign, written entirely in English,
which in no way was explained to them. The cash sale price of the unit was
$900.00 plus a $245.88 credit charge, making the total cost $1,145.88. At the
trial, the plaintiff admitted that the cost to the corporation for the appliance
34 Id. at 47, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
35
 Id. at 47-53, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 315-19.
36 Id. at 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
37 Id.
88 Id.
39 Id. at 48, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 315-16.
ao 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1966).
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was $348.00. When the defendants failed to meet the payments, the merchant
sued for the amount due under the contract terms.
The circumstances surrounding the signing of this contract are of
primary importance in rendering the contract unconscionable. The salesman
knew that the couple could not afford the unit. To induce them to purchase
this freezer, the salesman "distracted and deluded" 41
 the couple into believing
that it would cost them nothing because of the commissions they would re-
ceive from sales made to their friends. Laboring under this misconception, the
couple signed a retail installment contract written entirely in English, a
language largely foreign to them. As the contract was in no way explained
to them, they remained largely ignorant of its provisions. It is not .unreason-
able to assume that because of the deceptive sales practices employed, the
couple in signing the contract never considered that they were incurring any
contractual liability. Furthermore, enforcement of the contract would result
in unduly burdensome impositions on the couple. When unfair surprise is
presented and the resulting contractual impositions are unreasonably burden-
some, courts will not enforce the contract as it is unconscionable. Since the
couple did not return the merchandise, however, the court allowed the
merchant to recover $348.00, the cost to the merchant of the appliance.
The appellate court upheld the finding of unconscionability, but reversed
the lower court's decision on damages and allowed the seller to recover a
"reasonable profit" over his net cost." In so doing, the appellate court ap-
plied the third remedy of section 2-302 allowing courts to "so limit the ap-
plication of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
As the defendants had already used the product, a refusal to enforce the
contract would not put the parties back in their original position. Similarly,
as the unconscionable provision was, in effect, the price term, it would be
impossible to enforce the contract without it. By limiting the applicability
of the unconscionable clause, the court could allow the purchaser to keep his
appliance and the merchant to make a reasonable profit." Thus, the court
was able to secure performance of the contract at terms fair to both parties.
The fact that section 2-302 provides the courts with adequate remedies
to deal with the diverse factual situations that arise is an important factor in
insuring proper application of this section. The court in ITM used the first
remedy and voided the entire contract. In Reynoso, the court used the third
remedy to limit the applicability of the unconscionable provision. The second
remedy, permitting the court to strike any unconscionable clause and enforce
the remainder of the contract without it, has also been recently used in two
cases. Paragon Homes of New England, Inc. v. Langlois 44 and Paragon Homes
of Midwest, Inc. v. Croce" presented similar situations and may be treated
together. In both cases, form contracts for the purchase of household goods
41 Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (Dist. Ct.
1966).
42 281 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
43
 This would coincide with U.C.C. § 2-305 (1) allowing courts to substitute a reason-
able price where such term is absent in the contract.
44
 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
45 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
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were executed by residents of Massachusetts and Wisconsin respectively with
corporations licensed to do business in the particular state but not in New
York. The clauses in question named, the Nassau County Supreme Court of
New York as the sole forum for adjudicating any suits that might arise
under the contract. When the defendant homeowners breached the contract,
the plaintiff corporation brought suit in New York under the terms of these
contracts. Although acknowledging that such a clause is usually valid," the
New York court refused in both cases to take jurisdiction.
The ostensible rationale behind this holding was the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.47
 However, the court went on to say that if jurisdiction had
not been refused on these grounds, the clause would have been stricken under
section 2-302. The court placed strong emphasis on the fact that this was a
transaction between a merchant and consumer in which a form contract
was employed. Without elaborating on this, the court declared that the
parties were not on an equal basis.48
From this discussion several inferences can be drawn. It would appear
in these two cases that the consumers signed form agreements of the com-
pany, unaware either of the existence of the clause limiting redress only to
the courts of New York or of the legal implications of the clause. In either
event, the added expense of traveling to New York to defend an action would
largely discourage the defense of the suit. By striking the unconscionable
clause, suit can still be maintained in the jurisdictions where the transactions
took place.
The most recent case to be decided under section 2-302 is that of Unico
v. Owen." In this case, defendant Owen signed a retail installment contract
with the Universal Stereo Corporation for the purchase of one hundred forty
stereophonic records for $698.00. These were to be delivered at the rate of
twenty-four per year until all one hundred forty had been delivered. In addi-
tion, Owen was to receive a Motorola stereo record player completely free of
charge. With the extra credit charge, the total cash price Owen was to pay
amounted to $849.72. This was to be paid in thirty-six monthly installments
at the rate of $22.77 a month. To comply with this financing arrangement,
Owen signed a note which accompanied the contract. The name, Universal
Stereo Corporation, was printed on the front of the note, but on the back
was an "elaborate printed form" 5° assigning payment to Unico. Unico was a
partnership formed expressly for the purpose of financing the Universal
Stereo Co'rporation. In return for Unico's loan to Universal of 35 percent
46 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 16, 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 19, 20
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
47 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 16, 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) ; 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 19, 20
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967). This doctrine is: "the right of the court in the exercise of its
equitable powers to refuse the imposition upon its jurisdiction of the trial of cases even
though the venue is properly laid if it appears that for the convenience of litigants and
witnesses and in the interest of justice the action should be instituted in another
forum where the action might have been brought." Black's Law Dictionary 783 (4th ed.
1951).
48 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 16, 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 19, 21
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
48 - N.J. —, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
50 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 407.
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of the balances of customer contracts assigned to Unico, Universal sub-
mitted substantial control of its business operations to Unico. Therefore,
Unico not only had a thorough knowledge of Universal's method of opera-
tions but to a large extent fashioned the form of contract and note em-
ployed by Universal."
On the reverse side of this contract were various terms set out "into three
separate parts, the body of each part being in very fine print."52 For the
purpose of this analysis, the only term that need concern us is that declaring
"that the liability of the buyer to any assignee shall be immediate and
absolute and not affected by any default whatsoever of the seller signing this
contract." 53
 The effect of this provision was to make the consumers' liability
to the assignee absolute even if the seller failed to deliver anything under the
contract.
Owen received the record player and the original twelve albums called
for by the contract. Nothing further was ever delivered by Universal. After
continuing to pay the next twelve installments due on the note, Owen ceased
payment. At the time he stopped payment he had already paid $303.04. Unico
then brought suit for the balance due on the note, relying on the aforemen-
tioned clause to prevent Owen from using the seller's breach as a defense.
The court held that Unico was not a "holder in due course" and could
not collect on the note. 54
 It further held that the clause limiting the buyer's
right to redress was unconscionable under section 2-302. 55 In making its
determination, the court emphasized factors common to most of the cases
previously discussed. A standardized retail installment contract between a
merchant and consumer was used. The unconscionable provision was em-
bodied, in the words of the court, "in very fine print." Furthermore the op-
pression is shown by the conditions imposed by the contract. Under the terms
of this transaction, the defendant was required to pay the full amount of the
note to Unico even if Universal delivered nothing. Under the unique circum-
stances of this particular case, the seller and financier were virtually one and
the same party. It is this close relationship which renders the provision
allowing Unico to collect after Universal defaults unconscionable.
In deciding this issue of unconscionability, the court stressed the prob-
lems involved in the usual merchant-consumer transaction: (1) the substantial
difference in bargaining power between the merchant and consumer based
on the inequality of economic resources between them, permitting the mer-
chant to shape the exchange in his favor;" (2) the fact that mass market-
ing of consumer goods has required the use of standardized contracts with the
result that there is "no real arms length bargaining;"57 (3) the fact that the
ordinary consumer does not read the fine print nor would he be likely to
understand the "legal jargon" if he did. 58 For these reasons, the court con-
51 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 413.
52 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 407.
53 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 408.
54 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 416.
55 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 418.
56 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 410.
57 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 410.
58 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 410-11.
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chided that in construing such contracts, the courts must be "responsive to
equitable considerations.""
IV. CONCLUSION
Official comment 1 to section 2-302 declares the broad principle of un-
conscionability to be the "prevention of oppression and unfair surprise." The
cases discussed provide examples of a basic similarity of factors considered
by the courts in making their determination of whether a contract is un-
conscionable.
Courts have most readily applied section 2-302 in the area of form con-
tracts used in merchant-consumer transactions. This reflects the courts' very
practical realization that in today's commercialized setting many contracts
are entered into by consumers without any real knowledge of the provisions.
In determining if unfair surprise is present, the courts have considered
two general factors; (1) the contract itself and (2) the sales technique em-
ployed by the merchant. In the first instance, unfair surprise may be present
either because the unconscionable provision is embodied in the fine print of
the contract or is couched in language so complex that it is not likely to be
understood. In the second instance, unfair surprise may be present because
the sales technique employed by the merchant deceived the consumer. The
prime example of this type of activity is the "referral sales program" noted in
the ITM case, in which the consumer is deluded into thinking that his
purchase will be paid for by the commissions he is to receive from sales to
customers whom he has recommended to the merchant.
Oppression is demonstrated by the burdens imposed on the consumer
by the provisions of the contract. A great disparity between value and price
has served in the cases decided under section 2-302 as the primary indicator
that oppression exists. One way this disparity has been caused is through the
use of retail installment contracts. By emphasizing the low time payments,
sight is often lost of the high total cost.
Several courts have indicated that high price alone could be enough to
void a contract as unconscionable." This result stems largely from the hold-
ing in the MacIver case. However, the MacIver court in citing section 2-302
as an alternative holding did not delineate its reasons for so doing. Further-
more, in all the cases examined, disproportionately high price was merely
one element which aided the court in making its decision. High price is an
indicator that unconscionability might exist, but should not in itself be suffi-
cient to void a contract under section 2-302. If this were not so, a person who
purchases an item in an expensive store and later finds the same item selling
for a much lower price in some discount house might bring an action under
section 2-302 to have the sale set aside on the grounds that the price paid
was much higher than necessary. Thus merchants might continuously be
threatened with suits for selling items at a higher price than some competitor.
59 Id. at —, 232 A.2d at 411.
60 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Central Budget Corp. v.
Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 621, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (N.Y.C. Cir. Ct. 1967) where the
court suggests that high price alone might be sufficient to render the contract unconscion-
able.
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This could place an undue burden on the merchant's right to engage in free
trade. On the other hand, it would be far less burdensome to require the
party seeking to overturn the contract to prove that his assent to the high
price was caused by oppression or unfair surprise. This would discourage
frivolous law suits and still provide adequate protection against unfair tactics
of the merchant.
With the possible exception of the trend toward equating high price
with unconscionability, the fears of the critics have largely proven erroneous.
The similarity of factors considered by the courts have shown a basic uni-
formity of pattern. While section 2-302 has for the most part been applied in
situations where the courts already have another basis for their decision, this
should in no way detract from the section's potentiality. The few cases that
have been decided under section 2-302 cannot indicate the full future impact
of the section. However, they do provide some guidelines as to the direction
this section will take. If carefully developed, this section should provide an
effective means of protecting the legitimate interests of both parties to a
contract.
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